A full-depth survey could not be made because no one document that could be obtained und examined during the desired 6-month contract period contained enough Information. A review of Army aircraft failure documents and their availability dictated the use of the "Equipment Improvement Recommendation 1 * (EIR) reports as the best available source of failure data, but even these were not sufficiently complete. Therefore, the limitations described below were imposed on the findings of this survey.
In most cases the EIR reports gave no background data on the failures, nor could the contractor obtain drawings or operating manual details on the failed element In time to provide adequate assistance. In addition, the possibility for the overlooking and nonreporting of many failures vital to this type of survey exists simply because field personnel nray not be fully aware of the Importance of certain failures that do not appear to endanger the Integrity of the aircraft immediately.
Owing to the limited time of the contract period and the vast number of EIR reports, only a cross section of the reports could be appropriately evaluated. Consequently, the information found in this report represents only a beginning. The cross section chosen was a group of reports (dated between January 1, 1963, and August 31, 1963) on four helicopters (UH-1, OH-13, UH-19, and CH-34)and two fixed-wing aircraft (U-6 and 0-1). Pertinent information concerning the basic alrframe and rotor blades was Included.
DESCRIPTION OF WORK
Initially the work program involved locating the best source of failure reports (EIR's) and ettabllshimnt of contacts, clearances, and procedures for report collection. Trips w«re made to SMC Logistic Data Center, Lexington Army Depot, Lexington, Kentucky, and the U.S. Army Aviation and Materiel Command, St. Louis, Mlsnurl. The most logical source of failure reports and the only one that could be effectively utilized during the contract period was found to be at the latter location.
After screening the repository at the U.S. Army Aviation Materiel Command, some 2,300 reports relevant to structural failures were selected and subsequently read in detail at the University of Oklahoma Research institute facilities.
The reading yielded 463 valuable failure reports all of which were studied and analyzed in detail. The aspects of the failure important to revtoÜng the underlying cause and to providing guiriance for correction were recorded by means of a code (the report analysis system Is given in the appendix). The coded data were then summed both singly and assoclatively in en effort to determine problem areas common to all the aircraft -patterns of failure, aircraft features with high failure rates, materials with high failure rates, etc. Though the sorting of these data was done by hand, the system was designed so that it could handle a much larger volume via a punch card system. Finally, the 1963 Defense Documentation Center (DDC) indexes were scanned to get a picture of current work that might have application to the problem areas.
SURVEY RESULTS
Tables 1 through 4 contain the summation from all reports of each item in the breakdown of reported information (each Item in the analysis code). These tables served as a guide for obtaining (by further sorting) the significant results listed below. It is emphasized that these results are from an overall point of view and not necessarily from the details of any one aircraft or part -the failure report information was searched for aspects that could affect or have application to all future aircraft structures.
1.
There were several types of failures that could be Involved In the fatigue mechanism: Fuselage skin wrinkling accounted for 7 per cent of oil failures7"metallic crocks accounted for 47 per cent (36 per cent of these were In the primary framework, i.e., skin, stringer, frame, etc.); loose rivets accounted for I petcent; and catastrophic fractures on ionding gears accounted for 
*R«f«r to code In appendix. 8 2 p«r cent for a total of 57 pmr cent of all failures. As indicated hy the underlined Items, 34 per cent of all failures were involved in fatigue of primary structure.
2.
Separation of metal to metal bonded joints accounted for 11 per cent of the total failures; 80 per cent of these occurred on rotor blades.
3.
Corrosion accounted for 7 per cent of all the failures -62 per cent of these being magnesium stringers and skin, and 22 per cent being steel tubular trusses. All of these occurred on fuselage structures.
4.
In addition to corrosion, 11 per cent of the total failures involved surface damage. Of this 11 per cent, dents in rotor blades accounted for 26 per cent; rotor blade erosion accounted for 20 per cent; and landing skid shoe abrasion during pilot training accounted for 50 per cent.
5.
Rotors developing vibrations during service accounted for 8 per cent of the total failures. Sixty-two per cent of these failures involved blades that became unbalanced during service, while 37 per cent became untrackable during service. Of the blades that became unbalanced, 61 per cent were reported to contain water. These blades containing water utilized perforated honeycomb core in their construction.
LITERATURE SEARCH (DDC) RESULTS
A search of the recent literature listed by the Defense Documentation Center (DDC) yielded the information in each problem area as discussed below:
1. Despite the many current research programs on metal fatigue, no one program or combination of programs points to a direct solution. Although it would be desirable to have an accurate theory to explain the exact nature of the fatigue mechanism, structural failures could be reduced significantly through the development of structural materials with improved damping characteristics. Since sandwich materials offer great potential from this standpoint, work In this area should be continued. In th« us« of th« cod«, car« must b« «x«rcis«d to focus attontlon on th« follur« its«lf and not its rosults or som« sid« «ffoct. Th« torms N nont N and "unknown" found throughout th« cod« should b« us«d with cart: "nan«" wh«n th« report so statos or impli«s, and "unknown" wh«n an answar is sutplclonod to «xist undtr th« it«m in qu«stion. Wh«n an it«m is not d««m«d to b« significant to th« follur«, it should b« cod«d "not appllcabl«". This appllot to ail lt«ms.
2.

Ihm
To account for all folturos, Univ«rslty of Oklahoma Rawarch Institut« (OURI) numbars should b« aulgnad to account for th« additional falluras of Ilk« lt«ms total«d uncfor it«m 7 (quantity dafoctiv«) in block 32 of th« basic EIR. Th«s« data sh««tt should b« fost«n«d to th« prlmt data sh««t with a not« fo th« k«y punch«r to punch th«m so that th«y ar« idtntlcal to th« prim« sht«t «xc«pt wh«r« indicated. (Exampl«: OURI numb«r, aircraft sarlal rwmb«r # aircraft hours, «tc).
Not«s should b« mod« on th« data shoot in that som« information do«s not l«nd its«lf to tabular recording. A word plctur« of th« follur« will p«rmit th« statistical rasults to b« quallflad by pointing out th« f imltatlont which affoct th«m, and thus will add Insist to and incr«as« confldenc« In th« survty.
Th« following spocbl notos that portaln to th« qp«clfl«d parts of th« cod« will furth«r s«rv« to aid In its us«: These items are to describe the physical features of a cataitrophic rapture, a complete separation. Their greatest benefit would be to substantiate a fatigue failure. For a skin crack these would most logically be codod "not applicabl«" while for a crack in a thicker element "unknown" would be an acceptabl« code. 
